The formal position of the Leader of the Opposition in Parliament was created in a legal vacuum. Constitutional law scholar KEVIN Y.L. TAN explains why it should be given a proper footing in law. He examines the history of the institution in the Westminster system and explains why satisfactory reform of the L.O. system in Singapore also requires a Consitutional change turning the Speaker of Parliament into an elected, non-partisan office.
On 15 January 2026, the office of the Leader of the Opposition (LO) in Singapore was vacated. It was not dissolved by a vote of the House, nor by the loss of a parliamentary seat, nor by the incumbent’s voluntary resignation but by a press statement issued by the Prime Minister. Much of the ensuing headlines have focused on the ‘suitability’ of Pritam Singh to continue as LO after his conviction by the court for lying to the Committee of Privileges while under oath, this extraordinary event has yet to receive the much-needed legal scrutiny it demands.
Creation of office by executive fiat
On 11 July 2020, the day after the 2020 general elections returned 10 Workers’ Party MPs to Parliament, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong called Pritam Singh to congratulate him and informed him that he would be ‘formally designated as the Leader of the Opposition, and that he would be provided with appropriate staff support and resources to perform his duties’.[1] PM Lee’s announcement was given a formal gloss in a Ministerial Statement issued from the Prime Minister’s Office and read in Parliament on 31 August 2020.[2]
The Statement, issued under the hand of Minister in the Prime Minister’s Office Indranee Rajah, acknowledged that the ‘position of Leader of the Opposition [was] not provided for in our Constitution or the Standing Orders of Parliament’ even if there may have been some informal acknowledgment of certain opposition MPs as ‘informal leaders of the opposition’.[3] Even so, given that there are now 10 opposition MPs in Parliament, the position of the Leader of the Opposition would ‘be more formally recognised.’[4] The Statement did not, however, indicate how this office was to be formalised beyond the making of the Statement itself.
The Statement then went on to define the role and function of the Leader of the Opposition which was to ‘lead and organise the opposition’s Parliamentary business, including in it presenting alternative views in parliamentary debates on policies, Bills and motions; securitising the Government’s positions and actions in Parliament’; and nominating opposition members to serve on Select Committees. The Statement further provided that the Leader of the Opposition would, ‘from time to time receive confidential briefings by the Government’. Concomitant with his heightened role, the LO was accorded the following privileges: (a) taking the seat directly opposite the Prime Minister in Parliamentary seatings; (b) given an office in Parliament, staff support and resources, and an additional allowance; (c) the right of first response among MPs to ask the lead question of Ministers on policies, Bills and motions in Parliament; and (d) a longer speaking duration for speeches than other MPs.[5]
In arriving at the LO’s privileges and duties, the Statement declared the PMO had ‘considered the conventions and practices of other Westminster-style parliamentary systems, such as the United Kingdom and Australia’ and ‘adapted to suit’ Singapore’s political and parliamentary context.[6]
With the making of this Ministerial Statement, the office of Singapore’s Leader of the Opposition came into being. No further motion was moved to confirm the creation of this office, neither was there a vote on the matter. Indeed, Ministerial Statements was made with leave and not motions which the House may vote on. They are then entered into the record but has not further legal effect. The LO’s additional allowance – twice that of ordinary MPs – was also proclaimed by way of a joint press statement issued by the Offices of the Speaker of Parliament and the Leader of the House[7] and effected by a simple addition in the annual Budget and Supply Bills.
One of the privileges accorded to the Leader of the Opposition is a seat directly across from the Prime Minister.
Searching for a legal anchor
While the PM’s move was largely lauded, few noticed that there exists no legal basis upon which the PM could create this office. Neither the PMO nor the Leader of the House ever explicitly stated which specific provision of the Constitution, or any written law authorises the Executive to designate in Parliament, a ‘Leader of the Opposition.’ Indeed, the PM’s announcement was not followed by a constitutional amendment nor indeed any amendment to the Parliamentary Elections Act nor the enactment of any kind of ‘Leader of the Opposition Act’. One must thus surmise that the office of the LO was created as a mere extension of Executive power.
One can scour the Constitution in search of some power authorising the Prime Minister to create this office, but one will find none. Indeed, the Prime Minister has very few powers of direct appointment since most appointments of senior public officials must be made by the President (as Head of State), acting on the advice of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. Even the most important members of the Executive – ministers and parliamentary secretaries – must be appointed by the President ‘acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister by instrument under the public seal’.[8] Thus, all the Prime Minister has are advisory appointment powers which also extend to offices like those of the Attorney-General,[9] the Deputy Attorney-General,[10] permanent secretaries,[11] Secretary to the Cabinet,[12] and the Chief Justice and Judges of the Supreme Court,[13] as well as certain members of the Council of Presidential Advisors, [14]
If the PM finds no authority under the Constitution, what about other written law? The closest possibility is section 3 of the Parliament (Privileges, Immunities and Powers) Act. While this section is silent on the office of the LO or its creation, it nevertheless provides that:
3.—(1) The privileges, immunities and powers of Parliament and of the Speaker, Members and committees of Parliament shall be the same as those of the Commons House of Parliament of the United Kingdom and of its Speakers, Members or committees at the establishment of the Republic of Singapore.
Might this be the legal tether that might save the LO’s office?
Let us consider what the office of LO was like in the United Kingdom ‘at the establishment of the Republic of Singapore’ on 9 August 1965. At this time the office of the Leader of the Opposition in the United Kingdom was already a fully recognised statutory parliamentary office with a defined legal meaning and state salary under the Ministers of the Crown Act 1937[15] for close to 30 years. Thus, if one were searching for a constitutional convention or parliamentary practice that would in some way legitimise PM Lee Hsien Loong’s move to recognise Pritam Singh as LO, one would need to search for an Act of Parliament akin to the UK Ministers of the Crown Act. There is none. Another dead end.
The UK Parliament in the 1910s was in tumult, with no clear answer as to who was the opposition, let alone its leader.
Determining who the Leader of the Opposition is
Leaving aside the apparent illegality of the PM’s actions, let us next consider the desirability of leaving the recognition and designation of the LO to the PM. There is good reason why the UK Parliament saw it fit to provide clearly for the process of determining the LO in the 1937 legislation. Like many British parliamentary practices, the office of the LO emerged in the 19th century as an informal designation. It was not till the end of the 19th century that a clear two-party system emerged with an ‘official opposition’ and its leader as a central figure. Even so, the question as to who was ‘the opposition’ and correspondingly, who was ‘the leader of the opposition’ remained a vexed one especially in cases where numbers were close or party structures contested.
This problem was famously highlighted in the infamous Asquith-Lloyd George split in December 1916. Herbert Asquith, who had been Prime Minister from 1908, was pushed out as PM and David Lloyd George formed a new coalition government with the Conservatives and some Liberals. This tore the Liberal Party into two camps: coalition Liberals, who backed Lloyd George in government, and Asquithian Liberals, who opposed him and moved into opposition. After the 1918 general election, most successful Liberal MPs were coalition Liberals, while Asquith’s followers were reduced to a small, separate group and Asquith himself was out of the Commons. That left a fragmented non‑government side: anti‑coalition Liberals led in the House by Sir Donald Maclean, a party leader (Asquith) outside the Commons, and a rising Labour Party. This fragmentation made it hard to say which party was the main Opposition and who its leader in the Commons was.
By the 1930s, the workload of the LO (however designated or recognised) was so heavy that it was determined by Parliament that he receive a salary paid from the public purse. The issue of (a) identifying who the LO was; and (b) authoritatively and independently recognising the LO became matters of grave concern. Parliament recognized a terrifying prospect: If the PM has the final word on who gets to receive the LO’s salary, wouldn’t that make the LO beholden to the Government of the day? This concern was resolved in the 1937 Act in two stages. First, section 10(1) of the Act defines the LO as the ‘member of the House of Commons who is for the time being the Leader in that House of the party in opposition to His Majesty’s Government having the greatest numerical strength in that House’. Thus the question as to who the LO is answered on the basis of the numerical strength of the ‘party in opposition.’ However, if this remains unclear, then section 10(3) stipulates that if ‘any doubt arises as to which is or was at any material time the party in opposition’ or ‘as to who is or was at any material time the leader in the House of such a party, the question shall be decided … by the Speaker of the House of Commons, and his decision … shall be final and conclusive.’
The Leader of the Opposition as the Prime Minister’s construct
We are back to Square One. Section 3 of the Parliament (Privileges, Immunities and Powers) Act refers us to UK practice but in the UK, the LO is a creature of statute, not an executive construct or parliamentary convention. And even if we wish to follow UK practice, that which is enshrined in the statute stipulates that the LO shall be the leader of the largest opposition party in Parliament. The only judgmental determination under UK Act is for the Speaker to determine authoritatively who the LO is if that is unclear from the numerical count. UK practice has, since 1937, removed any discretion the PM may have had to decide who the LO should be.
But in Singapore, PM Lee Hsien Loong ‘created’ the office out of a legal vacuum and PM Lawrence Wong further defined it by stipulating the conditions for its occupation. In his 15 January 2026 Press Statement confirming the cessation of Pritam Singh’s occupation of the LO office, he invited the Workers’ Party to ‘nominate another elected Member of Parliament to serve as the next LO’ save that the ‘nominee should not have been implicated’ in the Committee of Privileges findings that ruled that Pritam Singh had lied.[16]
There is a good reason why the UK legislation does not provide for the removal of the LO by Parliament nor by the ruling party – the leader of any political party can only be chosen by the party itself. Thus, the Workers’ Party quite rightly pointed out – while rejecting the PM’s request to nominate a new LO from among the Workers’ Party’s elected MPs – that ‘the only tenable candidate would be a Member of Parliament who is the leader of the largest opposition party in Parliament, the Workers’ Party.’[17]
Punch Coomaraswamy (left) was Singapore’s last independent Speaker of Parliament (1966–1970). Since then, every Speaker has been a ruling party MP. Requiring the Speaker to be non-partisan would give more legitimacy to his or her determinations about who the LO is, argues Kevin Tan.
Formalising the Office
It is time to put the office of the LO on a proper legal footing. PM Lee Hsien Loong was right in concluding in 2020 that it was time that Parliament officially recognises the leader of the largest opposition as the Leader of the Opposition. However, the way in which this recognition was made and managed lacks legal ballast. If we are to take this office and its role seriously, legislative or even constitutional changes are necessary. The formula adopted by the UK in its Ministers of the Crown Act 1937 provides us with a good starting point for the institutionalisation of the office of the LO. However, I would add one caveat – we should, at the same time, amend Article 40(2) of the Constitution to make the Speaker of Parliament completely independent of any political party. Only then can the decision of the Speaker in cases of doubt as who is ‘the opposition’ or the ‘leader of the opposition’ be legitimised. On no account should this decision be placed on the shoulders of the PM as that would confer on the PM the power of patronage over the LO.
Back in 1955, under the Rendel Commission the Speaker was to be elected from among persons who are not Members of the Legislative Assembly.[18] Sir George Oehlers, a prominent Eurasian lawyer was appointed as Speaker and held this position until 1963 when Singapore became independent from Great Britain for the first time. In the meantime, the rules concerning the election of the Speaker was amended in the 1958 Constitution[19] under a formula which forms the basis of the current Article 40(2) which permits the election of Speaker ‘either from among the Members of Parliament who are neither Ministers nor Parliamentary Secretaries for from among persons who are not Members of Parliament.’ EW Barker, the newly-elected MP for Tanglin constituency succeeded Oehlers as Speaker in 1963 but vacated the chair when he became Minister for Law in 1964. Barker was in turn succeeded by two independent Speakers – AP Rajah (1964–1966); and Punch Coomaraswamy (1966–1970). From 1970 onwards, the Speaker’s position has been occupied by a member of the ruling People’s Action Party.
The legal formalisation of the LO office will thus also require us to return to the pre-1958 position insofar as the Speaker’s election is concerned. Only with the election of a non-partisan Speaker can we, in the event of doubt, expect the Speaker to independently cast a vote in favour of a motion or Bill or determine who the LO is. The office and duties and responsibilities of an LO are too important to be left to convention, or worse still, the Prime Minister’s indulgence. Reform is needed and the time is now.
– KEVIN TAN teaches at the Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore and at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, specialising in constitutional and administrative law, the Singapore legal system, international human rights and Singapore legal history.
Notes
[1] ‘Workers’ Party chief Pritam Singh to be formally designated as Leader of the Opposition: PM Lee’ Mothership 11 Jul 2020 https://mothership.sg/2020/07/pritam-singh-leader-of-opposition-pm-lee/; and ‘Singapore GE2020: WP chief Pritam Singh to be named Leader of the Opposition’ Straits Times online, 11 Jul 2020 https://www.straitstimes.com/politics/wp-chief-to-be-named-leader-of-the-opposition (both accessed 1 Feb 2026).
[2] Leader of the House, Indranee Rajah ‘Duties and Privileges of the Leader of the Opposition’ Singapore Parliamentary Debates Official Reports, vol 95, 31 Aug 2020.
[3] Ministerial Statement on Duties and Privileges of the Leader of the Opposition, Prime Minister’s Office, 31 Aug 2020 https://www.pmo.gov.sg/newsroom/ministerial-statement-on-duties-and-privileges-of-the-leader-of-the-opposition-aug-2020/ (accessed 1 Feb 2026).
[4] Ibid.
[5] Order Paper No 2, 31 Aug 2020 stated at para 2 that: ‘notwithstanding SO 48(8), with effect from this day’s sitting until the end of the 14th Parliament, the Leader of the Opposition Mr Pritam Singh shall be entitled to speak for up to forty minutes to any question in Parliament.’
[6] Ibid.
[7] ‘Duties and Parliamentary Privileges of Leader of the Opposition’, Joint Press Statement, 28 Jul 2020, https://www.parliament.gov.sg/docs/default-source/default-document-library/press-release-on-leader-of-opposition.pdf (accessed 1 Feb 2026).
[8] See articles 25(1), 25(3) & 31(1), Constitution of the Republic of Singapore.
[9] Article 35(1), Constitution of the Republic of Singapore.
[10] Article 35A(1), Constitution of the Republic of Singapore.
[11] Article 34(2)(a), Constitution of the Republic of Singapore.
[12] Article 36(1), Constitution of the Republic of Singapore.
[13] Article 95(1), Constitution of the Republic of Singapore.
[14] Article 37B(2), Constitution of the Republic of Singapore.
[15] 1 Edw VIII 8 & 1 Geo VI c 38.
[16] Statement by PM Lawrence Wong on the Leader of the Opposition, PMO Press Release 15 Jan 2026 https://www.pmo.gov.sg/newsroom/statement-by-pm-wong-on-the-leader-of-the-opposition/ (accessed 1 Feb 2026).
[17] ‘WP “unable to accept” PM Wong’s invitation to nominate next Leader of the Opposition’ Channel News Asia, 21 Jan 2026 https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/wp-not-nominating-leader-opposition-5873306 (accessed 1 Feb 2026).
[18] Singapore Colony Order in Council 1955, No 187 of 1955, Art 39(1).
[19] See Singapore (Constitution) Order in Council 1958, No 1956 of 1958, S 293, Art 35(2).