CHONG JA IAN (National University of Singapore) explains why the Republic must clarify how to operationalise its key principles of international relations — such as maintaining friendly ties, international norms, and consistency — in a rapidly evolving and tumultuous global environment.
Like many, I watched the heated exchange between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, U.S. President Donald Trump, and U.S. Vice-President J.D. Vance with concern. I was, however, not surprised. President Trump has talked of switching the U.S. position on Ukraine, ending the conflict “in a day,” since his campaign last year. His recent actions are simply following through on some of his public pronouncements. With this new U.S. stance toward international engagement, it should be obvious by now that Singapore and other smaller actors must develop clear responses that help them navigate a more dangerous and uncertain world.
The Trump administration’s position on Ukraine, claims over Greenland and Canada, demand to turn Gaza into a “Riviera in the Middle East” devoid of Palestinians, and threats to use force against Panama are broadly consistent with recent actions by other major powers. They appear to believe that those with sufficient capabilities and resources can and perhaps should simply impose themselves on others. This is a reversion to a world dominated by major powers, recalling nineteenth- and early twentieth-century colonialism and the Cold War division of the world. Expansive PRC maritime claims in today’s East Asia likewise carry echoes of that past.
A partitioning of the world into exclusive spheres of influence could leave Singapore much worse off. The republic now has greater reason than ever to demonstrate a clear course forward. Old approaches and assumptions behind Singapore’s past success may no longer work, or at least not as well. Even though principles such as sovereignty, autonomy, and maintaining cooperation remain important for Singapore, how to attain such goals can be fluid. Here, I offer some discussion about what is at stake and suggest ways to frame thinking about the challenges at hand.
Approaches to the outside world tend to receive less public attention than domestic matters, in Singapore and elsewhere. However, given Singapore’s dependence on the outside world, not understanding the circumstances in which we operate leaves us worse off, whether the point is to just protect ourselves or to work for better, possibly more just outcomes.
Singapore and post-World War II order
Some are watching the U.S. tearing itself apart and upending longstanding foreign policy with schadenfreude. Some are acting like spectators, keeping score as they tally apparent U.S. gains and losses vis-à-vis other major powers. They may be motivated in part by a recognition that since World War II, the United States has indeed acted with impunity and wrought destruction on many. Accompanying Washington’s claims about democracy and human rights is a history of cynical support for dictators, oligarchs, and other authoritarians.
Nevertheless, the post-World War II order, underpinned to a large extent by enduring U.S. foreign policy stances, has been of significant benefit to post-independence Singapore. Singapore grew prosperous on the general push toward international economic liberalization and could rely on a slew of international institutions to reduce transaction costs while also extending some restraint on major power excesses. There was as well as a degree of international stability; the absence of major power war enabled Singapore not to worry too much about security.
Stability and the absence of conflict among major powers, however, does not necessarily mean peace, justice, or fairness. Bearing the costs of the stability and prosperity for some were people caught in proxy wars and major power adventures from Korea and Indochina, Angola, and Nicaragua to Iraq and Afghanistan. Tumult in the Middle East, including the plight of Palestinians, resulted from Great Powers drawing borders, just as people in Central and Eastern Europe had to live for decades under regimes they did not want.
From the 1980s, the post-World War II order lost some interest in redistribution, with greater attention placed on markets, deregulation and globalization. This enabled remarkable growth in wealth, especially for big corporations and the very rich. These developments provided the backdrop for China’s rapid economic rise as well as the basis for Singapore’s emergence as one of the world’s richest countries. Along with this affluence came rising inequality that especially affected those in the middle and working classes.
Nonetheless, the post-World War II order created circumstances in which Singapore leveraged its historical middleman role as a commercial hub, bringing interested parties together to do business. The United States, Europe, and Japan are consistently Singapore’s largest sources of FDI even as Singapore moves capital to places like China, Europe, and parts of Southeast Asia. Then there is the movement of portfolio investment through Singapore, which often ends up around the world.
China is Singapore’s largest trading partner in merchandise, with Malaysia and the United States close behind, even as the United States and Europe outweigh others in trade in services. Services also make up the bulk of Singapore’s resident employment. Trade deficits with China and the United States are made up for with surpluses elsewhere. Singapore imports technology, services, and capital to produce components or finish products it can sell elsewhere.
See below for key comparisons drawn from SingStat. They are reproduced from an earlier article I wrote.
Figure 1. Singapore’s Top Trading Partners in Merchandise, 2022
Figure 2. Singapore’s Top Trading Partners in Services, 2021
Figure 3. Singapore’s Top Sources of Foreign Direct Investment, 1998 – 2021
A changing environment
Growing skepticism toward economic liberalisation, led by major economies such as the United States, China, and Europe, puts the existing system under greater stress. Barriers to trade, investment, and other commercial exchange could see rising costs and economic volatility. Exacerbating such pressure is disregard of international law and institutions by major powers, something accelerated by the withdrawal of U.S. support of key international organisations—including the United Nations system.
For smaller and medium-sized actors, a world with weaker multilateral institutions means a diminished voice and higher transaction costs. There would be fewer platforms through which they can voice concerns. Not having single channels through which to make and implement agreements with multiple parties can make everything ad hoc and subject disputes to constant renegotiation, with outcomes more nakedly dependent on who can bring more pressure. Stronger actors may have stronger incentives to renege on any deals made.
An erosion of international institutions and law intensifies the difficulty of coordination and collaboration across regions and the world. Progress on issues that require collective action — addressing everything from the climate crisis to global trade, maritime disputes, technical and scientific exchange, and human rights — becomes more challenging. Closer to home, the lack of regional interest in updating ASEAN to meet changing needs limits its ability to serve member states more fully beyond amplifying their voices, at least for the moment.
Then there are questions about sovereignty and autonomy in a world where major powers are throwing their weight around. In an earlier period, non-major powers fared poorly whether it was the Scramble for Africa or the mid-twentieth century division of the world at Yalta. Europe and North America have no monopoly on imperialism and domination. The Japanese Empire occupied East Asia on the pretext of “liberation,” while the Qing Empire along with its Han armies exterminated Zunghars in its westward expansion.
Desiring an end to hostilities in places like Ukraine is clearly understandable, but the world should distinguish between peace on an enduring basis on the one hand, and on the other hand, pauses that enable a later renewal of aggression and violence — particularly by the more powerful sides. World War II began in the Pacific with Imperial Japan being dissatisfied with just control over Manchuria. It started in Europe with Nazi Germany being unsatiated by annexing Sudetenland. This despite assurances made at Tanggu in 1933 and Munich in 1938, which turned out to be pauses, not peace.
Facing a Gathering Storm
Singapore is a net beneficiary of the post-World War II order, and its continuation promises overall net gain for Singapore even if the need to work on redistribution remains. The country certainly stands to lose if more powerful actors use their capabilities to run roughshod over others. A world that accepts or rewards violence as a means of resolving disputes will place smaller actors in greater danger. Singaporeans in uniform could be placed in harm’s way, affecting almost all families here. Support and protection could be had, possibly at a high price that curtails autonomy — if any guarantees can even be trusted. Resources otherwise earmarked for investment and social services may have to be repurposed for defence.
Rising economic nationalism, protectionism, and the accompanying decline in interest in economic openness also place stress on Singapore’s middleman position. Tariffs, export controls, technological restrictions, limitations on investment, and a desire to export more and import less may mean less demand for goods, capital, and services. Such developments reduce opportunities available to Singapore. Moreover, collaborating with one actor may be seen as detrimental to another, potentially inviting punishment by one or more parties.
Weaker multilateral institutions both globally and regionally may challenge Singapore’s reliance on rule of law and established procedures. International institutions and law as well as sovereignty norms provide medium and smaller sized actors, such as Singapore, with some predictability in their external interactions. They also somewhat equalize differentials in capability. Without these instruments Singapore would be much more vulnerable to the whims of more powerful actors. Debilitated international and regional institutions mean vulnerable states are more susceptible to the consequences of everything from climate change and conflict to internal disorder in ways that spillover to affect Singapore’s supply chains and economy.
That inability to control disruptions external to Singapore could prove costly as well. The country depends heavily on extended and extensive connections with the world, whether in shipping, air transport, or submarine cables. These are the channels on which Singapore’s economy functions. Recent years have demonstrated their vulnerability to conflict, tension, disease, and potentially climate changes. Brittle governance over these issues, such as ignoring the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), exposes Singapore to political tumult both thousands of kilometers away in places like the Red Sea and Horn of Africa as well as closer to home, in places such as the East and South China Seas.
Some observers express confidence about Singapore’s ability to be transactional enough, including with major powers, to tide it over. Such an approach assumes either that interlocutors will honour commitments or mechanisms that can support compliance exist. Institutions potentially face paralysis as major powers lose interest like the World Trade Organisation (WTO) appeals process or block the World Health Organisation (WHO) from doing its much-needed public health work. Sufficiently powerful actors may renege on promises or even refuse to base demands on fact. Such conditions may become chronic. Bad and unequal as things are, they can always become worse.
A need for greater clarity
For a while now, Singapore officials emphasise such principles as ensuring economic success, autonomy, maintaining friendly outward ties, rule of law and international norms, as well as credibility and consistency. These core ideas aim to allow Singapore not to choose sides and work with all, rather than seeking some sort of neutrality. There is little in the public domain about how the country seeks to operationalise these basic concepts, especially in a rapidly evolving and tumultuous global environment.
Some observers talk about Singapore’s need for hedging amid heightened uncertainty. Such an impulse is understandable. Yet hedging cannot and does not mean holding onto countervailing positions forever. Following the logic of financial markets on which hedging supposedly rests, there needs to be a sense of when, how much, and what to buy or sell at given moments. Not reacting effectively or in a timely manner can defeat the purpose of hedging and lead to significant losses. Hedging also involves costs, often the realisation of greater gains. Figuring these calculations out can be awkward when transactions and interlocutors are unreliable, returns unknown or unknowable.
Perhaps Prime Minister Lawrence Wong will presumably lay out Singapore’s foreign policy and security strategy at his upcoming S. Rajaratnam Lecture, currently scheduled for mid-April. Present circumstances provide less luxury to simply diagnose the external environment, treat developments like a disinterested spectator, or put more resources into less critical areas. More certainty in the direction in which the country is heading in its external relations provide citizens with a sense of what is at stake and how actions relate to broad principles.
Unlike other governments, successive Singaporean administrations typically do not release or discuss strategy publicly. Any approach will necessarily undergo debate and refinement. Given today’s acute volatility and unpredictability, greater clarity reduces the scope for confusion and misinterpretation by both domestic and external audiences. There may be a case for some kind of studied ambiguity. Without clearer direction, however, others may be even more tempted to fill the void with alternative readings that could fuel confusion and division, at a time when common purpose is increasingly important both domestically and for key partners.
Chong Ja Ian, an editor of AcademiaSG, is an associate professor in the Political Science Department at the National University of Singapore.