MOHAMED IMRAN MOHAMED TAIB and NURUL FADIAH JOHARI discuss the deep and distinguished roots of women’s rights in the Islamic tradition. This article is an edited excerpt of their chapter in the book, Why Not? Thinking About Singapore’s Tomorrow, published by World Scientific.
Women’s rights have been at the forefront of contemporary debates in modern society within the last two centuries. The global revolution in thinking known as feminism emerged as a social movement that, at its core, calls for equal worth and opportunities between men and women, a challenge against patriarchy in all its manifestations. This phenomenon naturally affects Muslim societies, where the call for women’s emancipation was one of the defining features of early modern reform. Contrary to the later essentialist critique by secular feminism that religion hampers efforts to realise women’s rights in Muslim societies, the emergence of feminism in the Muslim experience is rooted in religious consciousness traceable to the pre-modern period.[1]
This religious basis for feminism, Muslim or otherwise, is often missed. Within the Muslim context, to ignore this aspect plays into two detrimental camps. The first is “liberal White feminism” that employs the trope of the Muslim women in need of saving from “Islam”. As Lila Abu-Lughod (2013) demonstrated, this has been used to demonise Muslim cultures and justify political interventions — often with atrocious humanitarian consequences — into Muslim societies.[2] The second is the trope of feminism as an alien ideology — often of the corrupt enemy, the West — to destroy Islam. This is often upheld by Islamist movements who seek to capture social and political power in Muslim societies to implement what they view as Islamic exceptionalism in terms of how to order and govern society.
Between these two camps is the exciting emergence and expansion of Islamic feminism. As a movement, Islamic feminism adopts an ontological position that Islam per se is not the source of oppression, although as a religion, Islam has been used to oppress and deny women’s human rights. For Islamic feminists, the root problem lies within patriarchy, which informs the way religion has been taught, understood, and interpreted. Ultimately, Islamic feminists understand Islam as a dynamic religion open to multiple ways of understanding and interpretations.
In early 19th century Egypt, Shaykh Rifa’a al-Tahtawi advocated the education of women.
The emergence and rise of Islamic feminism
The rise of Islamic feminism could be traced to the late 19th century, particularly in Egypt. It corresponds with the awakening of Muslim subjects under colonial rule. Among the earliest proponents of women’s rights was the Al-Azhar don, Shaykh Rifa’a al-Tahtawi (d. 1873), who promoted women’s education as early as the 1830s when he was a member of the Educational Council of Egypt. He wrote a school textbook which promoted nascent ideas on gender equality, namely that girls should be educated as much as boys, and on equal footing. Hence, the differences between women and men pertain to their biological features and not intelligence.
Al-Tahtawi also believed that harmonious marriages and good upbringing of children required the education of women. Women ought to be given opportunities, albeit within their capabilities, to take up similar occupations as men. He did not prohibit polygamy, but asserted that Islam allows it only if the husband can do justice between his wives––a point taken up by later writers to virtually forbid polygamy.[3]
In 1899, Shaykh Muhammad ‘Abduh (d. 1905) became the Grand Mufti of Egypt, arguably the most respected position for a religious scholar in the Sunni world. He issued fatwas (religious edicts) that 1) promoted monogamy and allowing polygamy only when the first wife is barren, and 2) made it a legal requirement for a man who wanted to divorce his wife to state his case to judge and abide by the judges’ verdict and advice.[4]
These fatwas had a great influence on other parts of the Muslim world, including Southeast Asian Malay society. As a cosmopolitan trading centre and a major port for connecting pilgrims and students in the region with the Middle East, Singapore played a critical role in the transmission of reformist ideas on women. This could be seen in the Kaum Muda (Young Faction) movement fronted by figures such as Syed Sheikh al-Hady (d. 1934), Sheikh Tahir Jalaluddin (d. 1956) and Haji Abbas Taha (d. 1950). Between 1906 to 1908, the movement established a progressive magazine called Al-Imam, which advocated for the education of Malay girls, much to the chagrin of the traditionalist ulama faction.[5]
Syed Sheik Al-Hady, the most prominent of the Kaum Muda faction, was much inspired by ‘Abduh’s brand of reformism. In 1930, he translated a key text on women’s emancipation written by the Egyptian Qasim Amin (d. 1908). Amin was a student of ‘Abduh and his Tahrir al-Mar’ah (Liberation of Women), written in 1899, was a pioneering call for women’s rights in modern Muslim society. His critique of patriarchy was carefully constructed to challenge tradition and social conventions, rather than Islam. For Amin, God’s law demands “life and progress” rather than “immobility and inflexibility”.
Reformers Syed Sheikh al-Hady and Sheikh Tahir Jalaluddin.
Today, the intellectual and religious foundations of Islamic feminism can be found across scholarships developed by a loose global network of both female and male scholars. These scholars deploy multi-disciplinary approaches in tackling patriarchy. Though they engage primarily with the inherited body of knowledge from the Islamic tradition, they are not averse to adopting critical social sciences including the best of secular feminist studies located in the Western context. But key to their hermeneutical approach is contextualisation. The resulting synthesis can be said to be the third way between Western secular feminism and anti-feminist Islamism.
Although Islamic feminism draws inspiration from early Islam, it does not adopt an apologetic approach to women’s issues. This is unlike some modernist Muslims who engage in apologia by extolling rhetorical statements such as “Prophet Muhammad was a feminist” and “Islam does not need women’s rights because Islam has granted these rights from the beginning”.
Prophet Muhammad was not a feminist in the sense that his movement in the 7th century was not solely focused on instituting gender equality. But it would not be wrong to say that in seeding humanistic values for mercy and justice centred around the concept of tauhid (monotheism), he set in motion a reformist vision towards the ideal state of full humanity for women. Essentially, Islam is a liberation movement, with the Prophet emphasising concern for the marginalised and oppressed.
In this sense, women were counted alongside the poor, orphans and slaves whose rights cannot be ignored. Hence, modern Islamic feminism drew inspiration from the values of the founding moments of Islam while acknowledging that those were not fully realised during the Prophetic period. In fact, the progressive vision of the Prophet was subverted as Islam regressed into a patriarchal mode, as social hierarchy hardened through the subsequent consolidation of male privilege among political and religious elites.
One thing that sets apart Islamic feminists from their conservative counterparts is the rejection of the “natural order” of male superiority over women, often tied to the concepts of “qiwamah” (that generally denotes a husband’s authority over his wife) and “wilayah” (that generally denote male jurisdiction over women).[6] This gendered idea continues to sustain the view women must always be subordinated to men, and privileges men in all spheres of life from the family to social, political, and economic aspects.
Islamic feminist movements
While there are many important Islamic feminist movements, we highlight three that can be considered as pioneering.
A Sisters in Islam event, 2017.
Sisters in Islam, Malaysia
Sisters in Islam (SIS) was established in 1993 in Malaysia as SIS Forum Berhad, although the group had existed informally as a study circle in the 1980s. SIS was the first Muslim women’s organisation to approach Muslim women’s issues from the liberal perspectives of justice, equality, freedom and dignity within a democratic nation-state.
One of the defining features of SIS’ approach is to clarify the difference between shari’a (lit., the way) as divine will and fiqh (lit., the understanding) as human effort to make sense of the concepts and purposes of the shari’a. According to Basarudin (2016), SIS’ work has been about “producing and transmitting Islamic knowledge that accounts for women’s experiences and lived realities, as well as shifting cultural and political landscapes of communities of Muslims.”[7]
SIS had to contend with public campaigns to discredit its legitimacy. These were led by the government religious authority, JAKIM, as well as the Islamist political party, PAS, and several conservative Muslim NGOs. In 2014, SIS was mentioned in a fatwa (religious edict) by the Selangor Islamic Religious Council (MAIS) as promoting deviant ideas, namely “liberalism” and “pluralism”, and hence to be declared an unlawful organisation.
In challenging the fatwa, SIS was drawn into a long court battle that is still unfolding. In March 2023, the Malaysian Court of Appeal upheld the High Court’s decision that the civil courts have no jurisdiction to judge on the case brought against the fatwa, and that SIS should instead head to the Syariah courts to challenge the fatwa. This puts SIS in a precarious situation, as they face the possibility of deregistration, the confiscation and banning of books, and restrictions or blockers placed on their online presence.
Launch of the book, Justice and Beauty in Muslim Marriage, organised by Musawah.
Musawah
In 2009, Musawah was launched in Kuala Lumpur. Two hundred scholars, activists, policymakers, lawyers, and journalists from over 45 countries attended. The organisation describes itself as a “global movement for equality and justice in the Muslim family, which advances human rights for women in Muslim contexts, in both their public and private lives.”[8] In many ways, Musawah is similar to SIS, calling for reform of Muslim family law on issues such as marriage, polygamy, divorce, inheritance, custody and guardianship. What was significant was the collaborative efforts by a range of Muslim scholars competent in classical Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) and modern laws to develop the framework for actions for reform.
In terms of methodology, Musawah adopts a similar approach as SIS. Shari’a (God’s will) is not synonymous with fiqh, the human understanding of the divine will. Hence, legal rulings or ahkam (sing. hukum) that were extracted from the sacred sources (Qur’an and Hadith), are “human, temporal and local” and not absolute and permanent. In addition, legal rulings can be categorised into ‘ibadat (ritual/devotional acts) and mu’amalat (social/contractual acts). The former regulate relations between the human and God, and jurists argue that there is a limited scope for rationalisation, explanation and change. But the mu’amalat concerns human-to-human relations and is therefore open to rational considerations and social factors, which must conform to values such as fairness, compassion and justice. Issues concerning women and gender belong to this category and hence have latitude for change and reform.
The first Congress of Indonesian Women Ulama in 2017.
Indonesian Women Ulama Congress (KUPI)
Detractors often argue that equality ignores biological differences between the male and female sex, creating an unnatural state and chaos in gender relations. Islamic feminists in Indonesia in particular developed a response through the principle of mubadalah or reciprocity. This principle was initially developed and applied by reformist ulama working with a feminist NGO, Fahmina Institute, which became the defining methodology of Kongres Ulama Perempuan Indonesia (KUPI/Indonesian Women Ulama Congress).
KUPI is the culmination of almost three decades of engagements by the ulama with reformist ideas on gender. Islamic feminism in Indonesia could be said to have taken roots in the 1990s when “Islam and feminism converged and proliferated”.[9] The convergence could be attributed to the changing consciousness brought by the weakening of patriarchal norms in society. This corresponded with several legal reforms that ended discriminatory practices against women.
The study group known as Forum Kajian Kitab Kuning (FK3/Classical Scriptural Studies Forum) was helmed by a prominent ulama Masdar F. Masudi and organised by the central leadership of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) in the late 1980s. One of the outcomes is the publication of Wajah Baru Relasi Suami Istri, which is a critique of misogynistic traditions found in the popular kitab (religious text) on the rights of husbands and the duties of wives, called Uqud al-Lujain fi bayan huquq al-zawjain. Written by a prominent 19th century ulama, Shaykh Nawawi al-Banteni (d. 1897), this kitab was used throughout Indonesian pesantren (Islamic boarding schools), hence shaping the traditionalist but patriarchal views towards women.
One definitive feature of Indonesian discourse on Islamic feminism — exemplified by KUPI’s methodological framework known as mubadalah (reciprocity) — is its insistence on theological before legal reforms. Starting from the ontological assertion that any form of unequal relations could lead to injustices, the mubadalah framework critiques the dichotomous view of male superiority vis-a-vis female inferiority, and how female worth is measured in relation to male benefits. This is the root of stigmatisation towards women.
For example, when men’s actions bring harm or violence towards women, the fault lies with women, and therefore it is the women who must take measures to protect themselves or for other men to protect the women. Such stigmatisation could lead to further marginalisation, subordination, coercion and double burden on women. Viewed from this perspective, the mubadalah framework sees gender oppression as equally affecting men. This is because such unequal relations are based on the premise of the strong dominating the weak, which means that stronger male could dominate the weaker male and while men dominate over women, the stronger women would dominate over their weaker kind.
As a theological approach, mubadalah views gender relations through the lens of reciprocity, which means: 1) both genders are equally responsible in protecting the good and preventing harm, 2) strength in any form should not be a reason to oppress another person, and 3) the stronger persons–– male or female––are equally responsible to ensure that the weaker ones in society are treated with dignity. This reciprocity is based on the Islamic principle of tauhid or monotheism where only God is supreme while humans are created equal in status and dignity.
According to Dr Nur Rofiah, a theologian and Qur’anic scholar, tauhid “had brought a new lens towards status, position, responsibility and worthiness of both male and female.”[10] Firstly, in accordance with the Qur’an, the female was not created from the male (Q.4:1); instead, they were created biologically from the same source (Q.23:12-14). Secondly, man is not the primary being and woman is not a secondary being. Both are primary beings tasked as the stewards of earth (khalifah fil ‘ard) while in front of God, both are secondary beings as the created. Thirdly, women do not exist in order to serve men. Instead both are required to serve God and be of benefit to each other equally. Fourthly, there is no absolute obedience and duty of the woman towards the man; both must obey God and cooperate to fulfil their duties to do good. Fifthly, the human qualities of the male and female are not determined by their sex, but by their piety, measured by their contributions to humanity.
Headcoverings on sale in Singapore. Conservative proponents of Islamisation of society seem preoccuppied with women’s attire.
The challenge of religious conservatism
The discourse on feminism within Islam is still relatively marginal within the broader Muslim community. There has been a lot of backlash, notably from proponents of the Islamisation of society, otherwise known as “Islamists”.[11]
The conservatism and authoritarianism rising in Muslim societies is also patriarchal and misogynist. It further entrenches patriarchal and conservative norms through social media and popular culture, so that Islamists are no longer on the fringes of society, but are gaining mainstream clout and legitimacy.
This version of Islam and the drive to Islamise society, in relation to gender norms, reduces women to their bodies (i.e. both sexual and reproductive functions) and is about the reassertion of male control over women, both in the public and domestic spheres. It is apt to draw parallels on this with the wider emergence of what the German political thinker, Susanne Kaiser (2022) termed as “political masculinity”. The rise of assertive right-wing populism and hardline fundamentalism that inform conservative movements everywhere are common reactions to the present global situation.
Kaiser opined that radical economic changes brought by neoliberalism have primarily affected men. It is not merely a matter of men losing their jobs. It is men expecting secure jobs while believing that they are entitled to be the breadwinner, head of the household and unquestioned decision maker. Hence, slogans like “make it great again” and “take back control” reveal a gendered feeling of losing control.[12]
Even in a relatively secular Singapore, we observe the same preoccupation with women’s attire, such as the public campaigning for nurses to wear the hijab at the workplace. While it can be viewed through the lens of human rights and the freedom of religion, the largely male proponents of the hijab speak of it as a matter of absolute religious obligation. What is not noted however, is that the overwhelming pressure placed on Muslim women to don the hijab reduced the hijab issue to a matter of religious obligation versus the decision to work. It was as though women had to choose between wearing the hijab or keeping their jobs (and in some cases, to choose between attending religious or secular schools), when historically, the hijab has never been made an obligation to the extent that it is done now.[13]
Given the increasingly dual-income nature of Singaporean households, there is a greater understanding of the need for women to participate in the labour force, although it is often still argued that women’s economic contribution is secondary. In a patriarchal Muslim society, Islamic discourse is used to further entrench the model of the male breadwinner and head of the household, the presumption of women’s inherent domesticity and the subservience of women’s unpaid care work to men’s paid work. Women are expected to seek permission from their fathers or spouses to work. The preoccupation with the hijab can thus be seen as a last bastion of control over women, given the socioeconomic realities which necessitate women’s economic participation and contribution.
The drive to further entrench a patriarchal and authoritarian version of Islam also entails the demonisation of feminism and the so-called “liberal Muslims”.[14] According to Jumblatt (2021), one key characteristic of liberal Muslims is their challenging of “uncritical adherence to traditions found in the Islamic corpus of knowledge” and calling for “a fundamental rethinking of certain issues”. This is especially true, according to him, “in the domain of gender and sexuality” where they “question injunctions which they [liberal Muslims] deem to be not in line with the Islamic spirit and principle of equality.”[15]
Although ideas such as freedom and equality have been constructed from within the Islamic traditions by the ulama and activists in SIS, Musawah and KUPI, they are nonetheless seen as threatening to the kind of Islam understood by the conservative Muslim public. Prejudicial views and hate speech targeting Islamic feminists and liberal Muslims have spread, including the tropes that Islamic feminists are “destroying the Islam from within”.[16]
In Singapore, efforts to censure and demonise Muslims who are labelled as “liberal” include escalating complaints to religious authorities, the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS) or calls to prevent foreign speakers deemed as “liberal” from entering Singapore. Public talks have warned the public of this “threat” of the liberal Muslims and the “dangers of feminism”.
WALI (Women and Law in Islam) has conducted educational programmes about marriage and family, encountering conservative backlash.
The response by WALI in Singapore
In Singapore, Islamic feminism is a late phenomenon, with very few proponents. A small experiment emerged in 2010 with the formation of Not-Just-Inheritance (NJI), later renamed Women and Law in Islam (WALI). NJI/WALI was a synergy between several activists from the secular feminist organisation AWARE with a loose network of self-identified progressive Muslims called “The Reading Group (RG)”. The core members include lawyers, academics and professionals.
Initially, NJI focused on the unjust consequences of the application of faraid (inheritance) law that favoured the male and agnatic beneficiaries as coded into AMLA (Administration of Muslim Law Act). Members soon realised that this was related to 1) the lack of awareness on the basic distinctions between the divine will (shari’a), Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), and Syariah as codified state laws introduced during the colonial period that mirrored the British common law, 2) the almost total absence of critical engagements with emerging fields of Islamic feminism and reforms made in other countries, and 3) how a conservative interpretation of Islamic law was also holding back full adoption of CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women), which the government argued might not be consistent with AMLA.
Hence, NJI was renamed WALI and embarked on public education efforts. Between 2010 to 2017, WALI organised talks, seminars and workshops. Several members participated in regional and international conferences and training in Cairo, Zanzibar, Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta. Two landmark programmes were organised in Singapore. In 2012, a seminar called “Rethinking the Muslim Marriage Contract” was organised with the support of AWARE, the Department of Malay Studies at the National University of Singapore (NUS), the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences Religion Cluster at NUS, and Leftwrite Center.
The seminar attracted considerable backlash. The conservative Muslim public urged the authorities to ban it because the presenters include prominent “liberal Muslim” scholars, namely Indonesian feminist kiyai (religious leader) Husein Muhammad and Iranian-born then University of London’s professorial research associate Dr Ziba Mir-Hosseini. Several days before the seminar, the organisers received a call from the police inquiring about the event, which indicated a report had been made. The seminar proceeded without incident.
With the support of AWARE’s GEC (Gender Equality is Our Culture) project grant, WALI organised another landmark programme in 2014. A two-day training workshop called “Harmonious Family in Islam” was conducted for Singapore gender activists, to empower them with the tools of Islamic feminism in understanding family laws, tackling gender-based violence, and unpacking male bias in Arabic language and interpretations of the Qur’an.
An illustration accompanying an article on domestic violence, published by the Beyond the Hijab blog.
Struggling against rising conservatism
Several initiatives emerged as a result of the foundations laid by WALI. These include Penawar (a religious trauma support group for women) and Beyond the Hijab (a blog for Muslim women to share their experiences and challenges on a variety of themes). In 2018, members of Beyond the Hijab launched a book titled Growing Up Perempuan that was published by AWARE. The raw depictions of several Muslim women’s experiences growing up within the conservative Muslim setting of Singapore drew sympathy as well as unhappiness. Unfortunately, it was largely met with silence from the Muslim leadership.
Some younger activists have turned to the online space, facilitated by the rise of social media and platforms that are less regulated, allowing for a more democratic exchange of ideas that challenge the dominant narratives on Muslim women. There are now online spaces for queer Muslims as well, enabling them to develop a sense of belonging in an environment that is still very intolerant and sometimes hostile.
It remains very difficult for feminist Muslims to conduct activities like knowledge sharing and capacity-building workshops in mainstream spaces such as mosques or community centres. There has not been much support for Islamic feminism by community leaders, emboldening conservative and patriarchal voices to assert their alleged mainstream character and push away any attempt at reforms that could strengthen gender equality or empower women within the context of the Malay/Muslim community.
The call for gender justice and development of Islamic feminism is more important now than ever. It is also tied to the greater struggle against rising religious conservatism and authoritarianism which seek to erase the rich diversity within Islamic traditions and the religious freedom that Muslims, as citizens, should be able to enjoy like any other. The struggles of Islamic feminists must be seen within the larger contestations within Islam, as the faith confronts societal changes and the evolving needs of a modern and globalised world.
Mohamed Imran Mohamed Taib is the founding director of Dialogue Centre and editor of Progresif.net. He writes on issues of religion and society. He is co-editor of a book compilation of critical essays on Malay society, titled Budi Kritik (Ethos Books, 2019; expanded edition with Math Paper Press, 2020) with Nurul Fadiah Johari.
Nurul Fadiah Johari is a research associate at the National University of Singapore. Her current research interests include sociology of religion, social inequalities and critical discourses on mental health. She has written articles and book chapters in English and Malay on religion, gender and mental health.
The book, Why Not? Thinking About Singapore’s Tomorrow, is edited by Kanwaljit Soin and Margaret Thomas and pubished by World Scientific. It is available at Kinokuniya, BookBar, and the World Scientific site.
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Abdul Qodir, Faqihuddin. 2019. Qira’ah Mubadalah: Tafsir Progresif untuk Keadilan Gender dalam Islam. Yogyakarta: IRCiSoD.
Abdul Qodir, Faqihuddin. 2022. Metodologi Fatwa KUPI: Pokok-Pokok Pikiran Keagamaan Kongres Ulama Perempuan. Cirebon: KUPI.
Abou El Fadl, Khaled. 2001. Speaking in God’s Name: Islamic Law, Authority and Women. Oxford: Oneworld.
Abu-Lughod, Lila. 2013. Do Muslim Women Need Saving? Cambridge, Mass.; London, England: Harvard University Press.
AlSamara, Kinda. 2018. “Muhammad ‘Abduh: Islam and New Urbanity in the Nineteenth-Century Arab World.” Australian Journal of Islamic Studies 3, no. 1: 63-79.
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Basarudin, Azza. 2016. Humanizing the Sacred: Sisters in Islam and the Struggle for Gender Justice in Malaysia. Seattle; London: University of Washington Press.
Freedman, Estelle B. 2002. No Turning Back: The History of Feminism and the Future of Women. New York: Ballantine Books, pp. 1-2.
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NOTES
[1] For example, the philosopher Ibn Rushd (Averroes, d. 1198) rejects the idea that women are naturally inferior to men. Women can hold their own in a war, and nothing rules out the possibility of them becoming philosophers and rulers. He believes that the low social status of women in a society was because of them not being taught in human virtues, hence narrowing, and nullifying their capabilities. This situation, in fact, will impoverish the city even more. See, Ralph Lerner, tr. (1974), Averroes on Plato’s Republic. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
[2] Lila Abu-Lughod (2013), Do Muslim Women Need Saving? Cambridge, Mass.; London, England: Harvard University Press.
[3] Albert Hourani (2009). Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press; pp. 77-78.
[4] Kinda AlSamara (2018), “Muhammad ‘Abduh: Islam and New Urbanity in the Nineteenth-Century Arab World.” Australian Journal of Islamic Studies 3, no. 1: 63-79; p. 73.
[5] Abu Bakar Hamzah (1991), Al-Imam: Its Role in Malay Society, 1905-1908. Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka Antara.
[6] On the concepts of “qiwamah” and “wilayah”, see Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Mulki Al-Sharmani and Jana Rumminger, eds. (2015), Men in Charge? Rethinking Authority in Muslim Legal Tradition. London, England: Oneworld.
[7] Azza Basarudin (2016), Humanizing the Sacred: Sisters in Islam and the Struggle for Gender Justice in Malaysia. Seattle; London: University of Washington Press; p. 4.
[8] See the website, www.musawah.org.
[9] Etin Anwar (2018), A Genealogy of Islamic Feminism: Pattern and Change in Indonesia. London; New York: Routledge; p. 23.
[10] Nur Rofiah, “Prolog: Qira’ah Mubadalah sebagai Syarat Tafsir Agama Adil Gender”, in Faqihuddin Abdul Kodir (2019), Qira’ah Mubadalah: Tafsir Progresif untuk Keadilan Gender dalam Islam. Yogyakarta: IRCiSoD; p. 32.
[11] While the term may be contested and be referred to a wide spectrum of movements that seek to implement Islamic supremacy and rule, we refer to “Islamists” as social and/or political actors who 1) assert the supremacy of Islam over all other “non- or unIslamic” systems in society, 2) view Islam in an exclusivist, monolithic and absolutist manner, and 3) seek to impose, coerce or persuade others to adopt and submit to this form of Islam as a matter of obedience to God’s will and power that is not distinguished from theirs.
[12] Susanne Kaiser (2022), Political Masculinity. New York: Polity.
[13] See for example the nuanced views offered by Indonesian Qur’an scholar, Quraish Shihab (2004) in his book, Jilbab, Pakaian Wanita Muslimah: Pandangan Ulama Masa Lalu dan Cendekiawan Kontemporer. Ciputat, Tangerang: Lentera Hati.
[14] We note the highly contentious use of the term “liberal” to refer to a range of Muslim scholars and activists who offer a reformist view of Islam that is critical of traditions while finding compatibilities between Islam and modern ideas, such as the separation of state and religion (secularism), equality of religions before the state (pluralism), democracy, and gender equality. Many of these ideas, according to liberal Muslims, are not entirely modern but could be found within Islam. Liberal Muslims therefore put an emphasis on the values of freedom, tolerance, and equality. Democracy and human rights are also the main focus of liberal Muslims’ social and political activism. Sometimes, liberal Muslims are also described as “progressive Muslims”. The authors of this essay contend that there is a difference between the two, although there are many similarities between them – which is a subject best discussed in another paper.
[15] Walid Jumblatt (2021), Islam in a Secular State: Muslim Activism in Singapore. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press; p. 163.
[16] For a discussion on the mainstreaming of anti-liberal Islam prejudice in Singapore and the region, see Nurul Fadiah Johari (2017) Fearing the Enemy Within: A Study of Intra-Muslim Prejudice among Singaporean Muslims, Academic Exercise, National University of Singapore.