Concern is mounting about China’s intelligence agency luring other countries’ citizens, including Singaporeans, with fake consultancy opportunities. Some of these shell organisations are claiming Singapore connections, exploiting the republic’s reputation for trustworthiness. These trends call for new approaches to protecting Singapore’s national security, says CHONG JA IAN (National University of Singapore).
A senior establishment figure once described “Singapore washing” to me as “not an issue” and that “nothing can be done about it.” Such a view may help set aside immediate friction, especially in the immediate term. Given intensifying major power competition and a more uncertain world, however, I do wonder if this perspective and the more passive position it suggests may actually prove more potentially hazardous. Avoiding controversy, being cooperative, and assuming that openness is sufficient to allay foreign pressure may no longer be enough to escape being caught up in major power rivalries, like it or not.
Singapore mainstream press recently reported on what looks like a consulting firm, supposedly based in Singapore, seeking to hire former public servants and individuals with think-tank experience from Singapore. This follows two earlier reports about supposed think tanks with a Singapore presence that were trying to recruit individuals with think-tank or government experience from other states. All claimed to have employees with experience in Singapore think-tanks or institutions of higher learning. This seems to be a new and even more troubling facet of the phenomenon sometimes called “Singapore washing.”
These reports come on top of warnings by intelligence agencies abroad about the used of social media platforms, notably LinkedIn, by the People’s Republic of China’s intelligence service—the Ministry of State Security—to recruit researchers and individuals with governments ties and possibly security clearances. There are also recent media reporting from Australia about fake think tanks and consulting firms trying to recruit persons with similar profiles. Tactics include trying to spoof and take over the identity of real, extant commercial entities. In Singapore’s case, such tactics seem to make use of Singapore’s reputation for trustworthiness and a general lack of knowledge about the Singapore system.
Patterns in these developments point to the fact that more than the public, companies, or individuals, people in or close to the corridors of power tend to be favored targets for foreign political interference and espionage. Successful elite capture may provide much better investment when trying to understand and affect policy and political processes than trying to cultivate opposition, civil society, academia, or even media figures. These highly connected individuals provide faster and more direct access to policymaking, processes, and people. Such elite capture is also something that Singapore laws like the Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act (FICA) may not account for sufficiently, as I have argued previously. Those gaps need to be closed.
Another element that strikes me as curious is that there is no legal order to takedown or block these supposed think tanks and consulting firms. From the Protection against Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA) and FICA to the Broadcasting Act, Telecommunications Act, and Online Criminal Harms Act (OCHA), Singapore has ample instruments to mandate the removal or blocking of such content. Yet, problematic content using the Singapore brand as a front remains, means that on top of social cohesion, reputational and credibility costs to the nation. Why this is the case is currently not entirely clear, at least in public.
The Singapore state even invoked the OCHA to have X, YouTube, and Facebook remove AI-generated content allegedly from the PRC that sought to exploit and play up anti-Indian sentiment in Singapore as recently as June 2026. Notably, the order did not apply to PRC-based platforms such as Xiaohongshu (RedNote 小红书), WeChat (微信), BiliBili, Douyin (抖音)/TikTok, and Weibo (微博), on which similar content is available. I have not seen an official explanation for this difference in treatment, despite similarities in substance and behavior among these platforms. The action in June 2026 followed AI-generated content claiming splits within the long-dominant People’s Action Party.
The environment facing Singapore is far more complex today than it has been for a long time. If foreign interference is indeed a concern that the Singapore state and Singapore society needs to address, then it is probably important to focus on minimizing vulnerabilities and educating the public. This means being more honest and forthright about the sources as well as the nature of risk wherever possible, while making sure that our social and political systems are as well insulated as they can be from malign influence that may distort and misrepresent Singapore to domestic and foreign audiences. Singapore might also need to consider ahead of time what to do when, not if (as the slogan goes) there is a compromise to its political system.
Sometimes euphemistically termed “Singapore pivoting” and cast as a means to help firms and individuals get around restrictions from across jurisdictions, cross-border legal brokerage comes increasingly with reputation and governance risks for Singapore. Much of this has to do with more intense major power competition. Compounding matters is the fact that “Singapore washing” now seems to be caught in espionage and elite capture—on top of possibly money laundering and the circumvention of technological controls. Regardless of their origins, this recent series of events demonstrate that Singapore is a target in a more tumultuous and more competitive international context. A desire to stay out of the fray notwithstanding, Singapore would do well to better protect itself, including by informing the public about risks.
– Chong Ja Ian is a National University of Singapore political scientist and an editor of AcademiaSG.